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Strong Nash equilibrium

Concept in game theory

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Record originEnglish Wikipedia
Text licenseCC BY-SA 4.0
Source revisionFeb 10, 2025
Entity authoritySource title only
Source-derived summary

In game theory, a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) is a combination of actions of the different players, in which no coalition of players can cooperatively deviate in a way that strictly benefits all of its members, given that the actions of the other players remain fixed. This is in contrast to simple Nash equilibrium, which considers only deviations by individual players. The concept was introduced by Israel Aumann in 1959. SNE is particularly useful in areas such as the study of voting systems, in which there are typically many more players than possible outcomes, and so plain Nash equilibria are far too abundant.

Editorial summary

This brief starts where responsible research should: with the source description of “Strong Nash equilibrium” as concept in game theory. Everything that follows is an evidence route, not borrowed authority.

Editorial reviewA concise reference frame for defining the subject, testing terminology and identifying the institution closest to the evidence. The current lead gives the account dated anchors—1959—that can be checked directly. The selected authority fields contribute no independent date. The account is most persuasive where Strong, Nash and equilibrium can be independently traced.
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Vocabulary and entity names are the principal evidence signals here, because they determine the precision of every later search. The source revision retrieved here is dated Feb 10, 2025. The first chronological checks are 1959.

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Source & attribution

This entry incorporates text from “Strong Nash equilibrium” on English Wikipedia. Contributors are listed in the page history. Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 License. Selected authority identifiers and statements are retrieved from Wikidata under CC0; their references and qualifiers remain part of the verification path.