Foreign involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian war (2022–present)
overview of foreign involvement in Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine
On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, escalating the Russo-Ukrainian War that had begun in 2014 and marking the largest military conflict in Europe since World War II. As of 30 June 2025, Ukraine had received approximately €64.6 billion (US $75 billion) in military aid from the United States and about €84.7 billion (US $99 billion) from other international allies, primarily through drawdowns of existing stockpiles that were then delivered to Ukrainian forces. As existing stockpiles are expended, the allied industrial base has been gradually drawn in to supply Ukraine. Since January 2022 and as of August 2025, mostly Western nations have pledged at least €309 billion (US $360 billion) in aid to Ukraine, including approximately €149.3 billion (US $174 billion) in direct military assistance from individual countries.
Additional countries have also contributed, with Canada pledging CA$22 billion in assistance including CA$1.46 billion in military aid, Japan committing ¥1.5 trillion in loans and grants, Australia providing A$2 billion in support, South Korea pledging US$394 million for 2024 and an additional US$100 million in April 2025, and Turkey supplying Bayraktar TB2 drones through donations and co-production agreements.
By the beginning of 2025, the United States has provided around half of all military aid to Ukraine, with European allies providing the other half.
According to defense expert Malcolm Chalmers, at the beginning of 2025 US provided 20% of all military equipment Ukraine was using, with 25% provided by Europe and 55% produced by Ukraine. However, the 20% supplied by the US "is the most lethal and important."
Since 2022, no major state actor has matched the West in overt military assistance to Moscow; instead, Russia’s most significant external support has been economic. China accounted for roughly 35 percent of Russia’s oil and gas export revenue in 2024—about US $83 billion of the $241 billion total—providing a critical balance-of-payments lifeline despite Western sanctions. Iran has also supplied hundreds of Shahed loitering munitions to Russian forces, augmenting Moscow’s capabilities on the battlefield. In addition to this, Iran has trained thousands of Russian personnel to operate the drones.
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