Commensurability (philosophy of science)
in philosophy of science

Commensurability is a concept in the philosophy of science whereby scientific theories are said to be "commensurable" if scientists can discuss the theories using a shared nomenclature that allows direct comparison of them to determine which one is more valid or useful. On the other hand, theories are incommensurable if they are embedded in starkly contrasting conceptual frameworks whose languages do not overlap sufficiently to permit scientists to directly compare the theories or to cite empirical evidence favoring one theory over the other. Discussed by Ludwik Fleck in the 1930s, and popularized by Thomas Kuhn in the 1960s, the problem of incommensurability results in scientists talking past each other, as it were, while comparison of theories is muddled by confusions about terms, contexts and consequences.
Introduction of the term
In 1962, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend both independently introduced the idea of incommensurability to the philosophy of science. In both cases, the concept came from mathematics; in its original sense, it is defined as the absence of a common unit of measurement that would allow a direct and exact measurement of two variables, such as the prediction of the diagonal of a square from the relationship of its sides.
The term commensurability was coined because of a series of problems that both authors found when trying to interpret successive scientific theories. Its implementation is better understood thanks to the critiques that both Kuhn and Feyerabend have made in response to certain theses proposed by followers of the received view of theories. These include the famous thesis on the accumulation of scientific knowledge, which states that the body of scientific knowledge has been increasing with the passage of time. Both Kuhn and Feyerabend reject this thesis, in favor of a model that sees both revolutions and periods of normalcy in the history of science.
Another equally important thesis proposes the existence of a neutral language of comparison which can be used to formulate the empirical consequences of two competing theories.
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