Weaponized interdependence

Weaponized interdependence is a theory in international relations that describes how states can leverage asymmetrical interdependence within global production networks to coerce other actors. The concept was developed by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman in 2019. They argued that states with political authority over the central "hubs" in global economic networks—such as those for finance, data, and trade—can exploit this position to gain a strategic advantage.

This is achieved through two primary mechanisms: the panopticon effect, which involves gathering critical information from data traffic flowing through hubs under control of a powerful state, and the chokepoint effect, which involves a state's ability to limit or deny other actors' access to the network.

The theory challenges earlier liberal views of complex interdependence, which primarily saw it as a source of cooperation and mutual benefit. Instead, weaponized interdependence posits that the very structures created to enhance market efficiency can be repurposed as tools of state power, turning focal points of cooperation into tools of control.

Relation to liberal peace theory

Proponents of weaponized interdependence argue that the flaw in the liberal argument is not the premise that interdependence makes war costly, but the conclusion that states will therefore consistently behave peacefully. Farrell and Newman contend that liberal accounts have tended to avoid the question of power, focusing instead on mutual cooperative gains or suggesting that interdependence generates reciprocal, rather than one-sided, vulnerabilities. The theory of weaponized interdependence demonstrates how the very structures that liberals believe foster peace—global economic networks—can be repurposed for coercive ends. It suggests that states can exploit network asymmetries to inflict costs on others, effectively turning interdependence into a weapon rather than a source of peace.